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COMMENT
A Fourth Amendment Problem with Probation in North Carolina
I. INTRODUCTION*
In 1995, the North Carolina Legislature amended Article XI, sec-
tion 1 of the North Carolina Constitution to provide explicitly for pro-
bation as an appropriate sanction in criminal cases.' Attached to
Session Laws 1995, c. 429,2 the bill which authorized this constitu-
tional amendment, was a provision 3 repealing North Carolina General
Statute § 15A-1341(c). 4 Previously, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c)
provided that if the defendant chose, he could refuse to consent to the
terms of the probation and elect to actively serve the sentence imposed
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Scott Casey, Esq., for his helpful
insight in regard to the issues discussed herein.
1. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 429; N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1. The North Carolina
Constitution, as amended, reads:
The following punishments only shall be known to the laws of this State:
death, imprisonment, fines, suspension of a jail or prison term with or without
conditions, restitution, community service, restraints on liberty, work programs,
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust, or profit under this State.
N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1 (1995 additions in italics).
2. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 429 is entitled:
An act to repeal the law providing that a defendant may choose
imprisonment rather than probation or an alternative punishment and to
amend the constitution to provide that probation, restitution, community
service, work programs, and other restraints on liberty are punishments that
may be imposed on a person convicted of a criminal offense.
3. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 429. (Section 1 of c. 429 simply reads: "G.S. 15A-
1341(c) is repealed.").
4. Prior to repeal, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c) read:
Election to Serve Sentence or Be Tried on Charges.-Any person placed on
probation may at any time during the probationary period elect to serve his
suspended sentence of imprisonment in lieu of the remainder of his
probation. Any person placed on probation upon deferral of prosecution
may at any time during the probationary period elect to be tried upon the
charges deferred in lieu of remaining on probation.
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by the judge.' This change has had the practical effect of authorizing
searches of probationary defendants without obtaining the defendant's
consent to the search. This article will argue that this practice is in
violation of a defendant's protection under the Fourth Amendment,
applicable to the State of North Carolina through the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343, when a judge orders a defen-
dant to be placed on probation, he may order appropriate terms for the
probation, including special circumstances.7 One of the provisions of
§ 15A-1343 8 allows a judge to order the defendant to submit to
searches by a parole officer, without probable cause, if "reasonably
necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to
assist him to do so."9 Previously, the defendant would then have been
given the option of serving the active sentence imposed, or agreeing to
these terms, which would include the defendant signing a waiver of his
Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure to
the extent ordered. 10
The current practice of North Carolina courts, following the
repeal of § 15A-1341(c), is to order probation without obtaining the
consent of the defendant to these searches.'1 This leaves the defendant
with no choice as to the disposition of the case, and no option to con-
sent or refuse the conditions. 2 The defendant must comply with the
order rather than actively serving the original sentence, face a possible
probation violation, and be subject to searches and seizures which
5. Id.
6. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343 (1999).
8. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(bl)(7). This statute, in relevant part, provides:
In addition to the regular conditions of probation . . . the court may, as a
condition of probation, require that the defendant comply with . . . the
following special condition[ ]: . . . (7) Submit at reasonable times to
warrantless searches by a probation officer of his person and of his vehicle
and premises ....
Id. (emphasis added).
9. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(a).
10. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c).
11. Following the repeal of § 15A-1341(c), consent is no longer part of the
probationary formula. However, searches of a probationer pursuant to § 15A-
1343(bl)(7) must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
12. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c) previously read: "Election to Serve Sentence or
Be Tried on Charges-Any person placed on probation may at any time during the
probationary period elect to serve his suspended sentence of imprisionment in lieu of
the remainder of his probation."
[Vol. 23:143
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may lack any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 13 In effect, the
State has taken away the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant
for the period of his probation, without obtaining a waiver or the
defendant's consent.
This practice has not been addressed by North Carolina courts in
any reported decisions, nor has this situation been expressly
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in this specific context.
Therefore, in evaluating the validity of this practice, it is necessary to
examine the rationale of this probation system, and analyze how North
Carolina has handled this issue under the previous statute, as well as
the rationale adopted by other states in dealing with searches incident
to probation.
When a search is conducted of a probationary defendant, it may
conducted without probable cause, or even a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of specific criminal wrongdoing. 14 These searches may only
be conducted by probation officers at reasonable times. I5 However,
there is currently no requirement that probable cause or reasonable
suspicion exist as to specific wrongdoing. This, it appears, violates the
protections of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,16 which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
1 7
II. BACKGROUND
Under former § 15A-1341(c), the reasonableness requirement for
probationary searches was met by the limited waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights to which the defendant consented as part of the probation
agreement.' 8 It was clear under the previous North Carolina provi-
sions that "a suspended sentence or probationary judgment can only
be entered with the consent of the defendant."'19 Consent was used to
13. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345 (1999).
14. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b1)(7). Under this section, a criminal defendant
may be subject to "warrantless searches" as a condition of his probation.
15. Id.
16. U.S. Const. amend. IV. (The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.").
17. Id.
18. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c).
19. Shore v. Edminsten, 290 N.C. 628, 631, 227 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1976). See State
v. White, 264 N.C. 600, 142 S.E.2d 153 (1965); State v. King, 42 N.C. App. 210, 256
20001
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satisfy the requirements of the North Carolina Constitution, as well as
the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements. 20 This waiver of
Fourth Amendment protections was limited in scope to comply with
the requirement of the United States Supreme Court that such a waiver
must be consensual and narrowly tailored to the purpose which the
search is meant to accomplish. 21 In general, the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant for a nonconsensual search of a defendant or his
home unless the search falls within one of the clearly delineated excep-
tions established by the Supreme Court.
2 2
For probationers, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized a standard lower than probable cause.23 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,
a probation officer had reasonable suspicion that Griffin possessed a
firearm in violation of his parole. 24 Justice Scalia found that "the spe-
cial needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant require-
ment impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of
probable cause by reasonable grounds. '25 The Court found the search
acceptable "because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that
itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement
under well-established principles. ' 26 Therefore, searches pursuant to a
valid regulation will be upheld so long as the facts and circumstances
establish the reasonableness of the search.27
However, it is important to note that Griffin "only addressed the
standard required to search"; it did not address the reasons why a pro-
bationer receives a lower standard of protection.28 A search under a
reasonableness standard must be based upon an objectively reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 29 The reasonable-
ness standard does not allow unfettered discretion of the officer to
S.E.2d 247 (1979); State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 212 S.E.2d 566, cert. denied,
287 N.C. 263, 214 S.E.2d 436 (1975).
20. Searches of a probationer, while not requiring probable cause, must be
narrowly tailored, reasonable, and limited to those terms "reasonably necessary to
insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so." N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(a). See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
21. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). See also Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. See Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
23. Griffin, 483 U.S. 868.
24. Id. at 871.
25. Id. at 876.
26. Id. at 873.
27. Id.
28. See United States v. Gianetta, 909 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1990).
29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
146 [Vol. 23:143
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conduct a search.30 Thus far, consent is the only basis which has been
recognized to allow searches without any suspicion of particularized
wrongdoing.31
III. PROBATION AS A DE FACTO SUSPENDED SENTENCE
There is no dispute that rights may be waived.3 2 However, the
state has never had the right to trample a probationer's constitutional
rights through the use of a probation decree.3 3 A probation order can-
not be a Bill of Attainder.3 4 In support of such view the Michigan
Court of Appeals has taken the position that when constitutional
rights are statutorily restricted by a probation decree, the probationer
has the option to consent to the decree or reject it. 3 5 "Probation is a
matter of grace and rejectable ... at the option of the probationer. But
it is not a Bill of Attainder for the period of probation."36 Indeed, a
probationer does not lose all of his rights. In fact, "the liberty of a
[probationer], although indeterminate, includes many of the core val-
ues of unqualified liberty. '3 7 Although on probation, a defendant
retains the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.38
In N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343, the legislature outlined the condi-
tions which may be part of a defendant's probation.3 9 When assigned
correctly, these conditions will be no more restrictive than required to
help rehabilitate the defendant.4 ° Most of these terms do not relate to
rights protected by the Constitution, and a waiver would be unneces-
sary for a valid probation order in these instances. 4 1 Regular condi-
tions are incorporated via § 15A-1343(b) and specific terms via § 15A-
1343(bl). 42 Most of these conditions may be ordered because they
generally do not implicate any constitutional rights. The problem
30. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
31. United States v. Wryn, 952 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1991).
32. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding advance waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights must be voluntary). See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C.
App. 663, 207 S.E.2d 263 (1974).
33. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
34. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10. ("No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; . . . pass any bill of attainder
. . . .11).
35. People v. Peterson, 233 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. 1975).
36. Id. at 255.
37. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
38. Id.
39. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343 (1999).
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(a).
41. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b}-(d).
42. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(bl).
20001
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arises from a coupling of the repeal of § 15A-1341(c), which allowed a
probationer to elect to serve an active jail sentence rather than proba-
tion, with § 15A-1343(bl)(7), which requires the probationer to
"[s]ubmit at reasonable times to warrantless searches by a probation
officer of his person and of his vehicle and premises while he is
present. 43
Under prior law, probationary searches were allowed by obtaining
the consent of the probationer.44 Now, however, a judge, pursuant to
N.C. Const. art. XI, sec. 1, may order probation, including this condi-
tion, without consent as the basis for the search.45 Griffin requires
that this search be based on reasonable suspicion,46 but the statute
allows any search, limited only to a reasonable time.47
As in many areas of the law, courts must look at the substance of
a statute rather than its mere form. 48 The North Carolina Constitu-
tion, as amended, states:
The following punishments only shall be known to the laws of this
State: death, imprisonment, fines, suspension of a jail or prison term
with or without conditions, restitution, community service, restraints on
liberty, work programs, removal from office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under this State.49
While this amendment appears to provide probation as a criminal
sanction, ° the actual workings of this provision will involve a judge
pronouncing an active sentence, but suspending the sentence in favor
of probation. The probation itself is not the punishment; it is given in
lieu of the active sentence. The United States Supreme Court has
"rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or a 'privilege'. ''S
The same rationale applies to this form-substance argument. The prac-
tical effect of this change is not that the sentencing methods have
43. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(bl)(7).
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c) (repealed 1995). See supra text accompanying
note 4. See also State v. Cole, 241 N.C. 576, 582, 86 S.E.2d 203, 207 (1955).
45. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 1.
46. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-880 (1987).
47. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(bl)(7). This section requires, as a possible
condition of probation, that a defendant on probation submit to warrantless searches
"at reasonable times."
48. See, e.g., Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439 (1999).
49. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1 (1995 additions in italics). See also 1995 N.C. Sess.
Laws 429 (see supra text accompanying note 2.).
50. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1. See also 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 429.
51. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
[Vol. 23:143
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changed; only the provision relating to consent has changed. 2 When
a defendant refuses to consent to the terms of the probation, the court
invariably orders an active sentence. Although the form provides for
probation as a punishment, it is still a suspended sentence in
substance.
IV. CONSENT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Failure to obtain consent before imposing these conditions vio-
lates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, unless the
State has a narrowly tailored exception, other than consent, to the
probable cause requirement. An order, such as the one contemplated
here, is effectively forced consent, and fails to provide the probationer
an opportunity to be heard and refuse consent to the search require-
ment of the probation sentence. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be
coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.
For, no matter how subtly the coercion were applied, the resulting
"consent" would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police
intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.53
This issue was also addressed in United States ex. rel Coleman v.
Smith. 4 In Coleman, the court held that a condition of parole that was
involuntary, but provided for a parole officer's search of parolee's resi-
dence-without suspicion of parole violation-was unreasonable.55
The court also held that to have a proper search in these circum-
stances, the state must prove that consent was in fact freely and volun-
tarily given.56 By refusing to allow a probationer to reject warrantless
searches that are not supported by reasonable suspicion, the state lim-
its the defendant's due process rights by forcing overbroad conditions
on the defendant. 57 "A condition which is a violation of the defen-
dant's constitutional right and, therefore, beyond the power of the
court to impose is [pier se unreasonable." 58 Therefore, the State can-
52. The provision that related to consent was N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(c)
(repealed 1995).
53. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). See Kuenstler v. State,
486 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (holding that when a motion fails to fully
inform the probationer, he is denied the rudiments of due process).
54. 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
57. State v. Caudle, 276 N.C. 550, 173 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
58. Id. at 554, 173 S.E.2d at 781.
2000]
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not unilaterally claim that it is granting consent on behalf of the
defendant. 59
V. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Two other possible bases for searches lacking both probable cause
and reasonable suspicion that the Supreme Court has recognized are
searches incident to arrest and searches under the inventory ratio-
nale.6" Both of these fail to logically encompass the search of a proba-
tioner. First, a search incident to arrest is only applicable to the time
of incarceration of the defendant.61 It could not reasonably be argued
that a police officer maintains the "immediate control" over the indi-
vidual that justifies such a search.62 Applying the inventory rationale
is equally unreasonable. Probation searches are used neither to "safe-
guard the owner's property" nor "guarantee the safety of the custodi-
ans."63 The random search of the defendant's person, vehicle, and
dwelling is too broad to fit into this limited exception. The state does
not gain possessory rights over a defendant's dwelling merely because
he is on probation.64 Put simply, the inventory rationale lacks the
immediacy contemplated by these exceptions.65
The following argument could also be advanced by the state: if the
state may completely deny a probationer his liberty by placing him in
jail, then it may impose limitations which are a lesser burden on his
liberty. Hence, anything short of jail is an acceptable alternative for
the probationer, and all his rights are satisfied. This is an argument
which the United States Supreme Court has addressed in the context
of the First Amendment-and expressly rejected.66 In 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island,67 the Supreme Court effectively reversed Posadas
De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico on this point.68 In
59. Bumper, 391 U.S. 543.
60. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
61. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
62. Id. at 760.
63. Cady, 413 U.S. at 446.
64. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
65. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (allowing exception to the
warrant requirement when "the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.") (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
66. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
67. Id.
68. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986), called into doubt by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
[Vol. 23:143
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Posadas, the Court had narrowly held that if Puerto Rico could pro-
hibit all advertising for gambling, it could prohibit advertising for gam-
bling not based in Puerto Rico. Noting its disapproval, the Court in 44
Liquormart stated: "[We] cannot accept the State's . . . 'greater-
includes-the-lesser' reasoning [because it is] inconsistent with both
logic and well-settled doctrine. '69 Applying the reasoning in 44
Liquormart to Fourth Amendment concerns, a possible complete dep-
rivation of liberty does not authorize an incremental one. Analo-
gously, the Supreme Court, in two cases which operate together to
further highlight the constitutional infirmity of the "greater-includes-
the-lesser" argument, has held that the mere fact that police may estab-
lish a road block and stop all vehicles traveling down a certain road
does not give them the right to stop any vehicle at random on that
same road.7°
VI. CONSENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Consent is left as the only basis to justify the imposition of a
search that lacks reasonable suspicion of particular wrongdoing.
Implicit in Griffin v. Wisconsin is that without consent, any search
must be narrowly tailored to satisfy the reasonableness requirement.71
Wisconsin's statute, like the previous North Carolina provision, pro-
vided for consent hearings for probationers.7 2 Even in cases where
consent is obtained, it does not waive all of the probationer's freedom
from unreasonable searches.73 Indeed, some courts do not believe that
a probationer can consent to unreasonable searches and seizures.74
Drawing on the language in Bumper v. North Carolina that consent
69. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.
70. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding police may not
make random vehicle stops), with Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990) (holding sobriety checkpoints constitutional).
71. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
72. Wis. Stat. §§ 161.47, 973.20 (1985-1986).
73. N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1343(bl)(7) (1999). This statute, in relevant part,
provides:
In addition to the regular conditions of probation .. .the court may, as a
condition of probation, require that the defendant comply with . . . the
following special condition[ ]: . . . (7) Submit at reasonable times to
warrantless searches by a probation officer of his person and of his vehicle
and premises ... but the probationer may not be required to submit to any
other search that would otherwise be unlawful.
Id.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975);
State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379 (Haw. 1984); Johnson v. State, 386 So.2d 291 (Fla.
1980); State v. Rupp, 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. 1978).
20001
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must be "in fact, freely and voluntarily given,"' 75 these courts have held
that a defendant faced with choosing probation or prison is not freely
and voluntarily giving his consent.7 6
The theory behind these arguments is that a defendant is in a
poor bargaining position to complain about the conditions of the pro-
bation.77 In North Carolina, consent to probationary searches is lim-
ited by several factors.78 For example, searches may only be conducted
by probation officers, 9 (who are, of course, vested with arrest powers
in North Carolina). 0 Also, searches can only take place at reasonable
times." Even given similar limitations such as these, other states have
upheld a defendant's consent only when freely given and the terms of
the search are narrowly tailored. 2 Missouri has held that "a proba-
tioner is free to reject the terms of a probation agreement ...and
accept instead the punishment for his crime. "83
However, many courts have held that consent given by a defen-
dant faced with this Hobson's choice is constitutionally valid.84 The
Ohio Supreme Court succinctly stated: "While it is true that the defen-
dant was presented with choosing whether to consent to warrantless
75. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
76. See United States v. Gianetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990) (the court
stated: "a question of coercion would arise as to any contention that 'agreement' to a
probation search condition constitutes a general consent to search"); United States v.
Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) (the court
stated: "As a practical matter, a defendant's consent to a probation condition is likely
to be nominal where consent is given only to avoid imprisionment"); Oregon v.
Thomas, 575 P.2d 171 (Or. 1978) (holding that requiring submission to police officer
for warrantless search invalid); Oregon v. Davis, 891 P.2d 1373, 1379 (Or. Ct. App.
1995), review denied, 899 P.2d 1197 (Or. 1995) (the court stated: "The environment
surrounding the probation search may be sufficiently coercive so as to preclude the
probationer from raising an objection.").
77. See, e.g., Pierce, 561 F.2d 735.
78. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341 to 1342.
79. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(bl)(7).
80. N.C. Gen. Stat. §15-205 (1999).
81. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1341(bl)(7).
82. See, e.g., Fox v. State, 527 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 2000) (holding waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights invalid if not obtained as part of the plea bargaining process). See
also State v. Marquart, 945 P.2d 1027 (N.M. 1997), cert. denied, 944 P.2d 274 (N.M.
1997); Dearth v. State, 390 So.2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Oregon, 575
P.2d 171 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
People v. Peterson, 233 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
83. State v. Fetterhoff, 739 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1989); State v.
Josephson, 867 P.2d 993 (Idaho 1994); Wilson v. State, 752 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. Ct. App.
1988).
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searches at any time or to remain incarcerated, the fact that the defen-
dant must decide between two unattractive choices does not invalidate
the waiver.""5 Prior to the recent amendment eliminating the defen-
dant's choice between serving an active sentence and probation, con-
sent searches, part of the standard investigatory techniques of law
enforcement,86 apparently found favor with North Carolina courts.87
While consent may place the defendant in an unenviable situation of
choosing random searches or jail, when limited in scope North Caro-
lina has accepted consent as a valid solution to imposing searches by
probation officers as a means of rehabilitative and deterrent
punishment.88
VII. RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING THE CONSENT OPTION
All this raises the following question: when would anyone ever
prefer jail to the imposition of warrantless searches? Remarkably,
there are several situations in which a defendant may wish to avoid
probationary searches which may not be accompanied by a reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion of wrong-doing. "One need not carry contra-
band to prefer that the police not examine one's private
possessions."89 Perhaps he finds them embarrassing and intrusive.
Perhaps he finds these searches too onerous, or the period of time over
which he may be searched too long. Perhaps he just prefers to place
these events behind him as quickly as possible. These possibilities
stem from the basic concept that, upon weighing the factors, the defen-
dant prefers the inconvenience of a shorter prison term to the long
term waiver of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches.
85. State v. Benton, 695 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ohio 1998). See Fox, 527 S.E.2d at 849
(observing that "such waivers are valid on the theory that the defendant has
voluntarily consented to such a condition as 'an acceptable alternative to prison"'); see
also State v. Ullring, 741 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2664 (2000)
(applying consent waiver to bail conditions).
86. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973).
87. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663, 207 S.E.2d 263 (1974).
We find valid the conditions of the prior suspended sentences by which
defendants gave consent to search of their premises at reasonable hours
without a search warrant.... We see no sound reason why such waiver and
consent may not effectively be given by agreeing thereto as one of the
conditions of a suspended sentence.
Id.
88. Id.
89. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 393 (1976) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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An example of this balance in favor of prison can be found in
Higdon v. United States.9" Higdon was convicted of defrauding the gov-
ernment.9 1 His probation entailed the forfeiture of all his assets, full-
time charity work (6200 hours in three years) without pay, and the
loss of all his pension rights.92 Such conditions resulted in his failure
to be able to pay child support or support his family.93 While this case
did not involve a condition of warrantless searches, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the conditions to be "needlessly harsh",
remanding the case to the trial court.94 Although this case was not a
matter of constitutional significance, it suggests that not all defendants
will wish to waive their constitutional rights to avoid an active prison
term.
Under North Carolina's present system, the trial court makes this
choice for the defendant, depriving him of the ability to either consent
to a limited waiver of his protections or to serve his sentence for his
crime. Also, the judge is no longer obligated to send a probationer to
jail if he violates the terms of his probation.95 Article XI, section 1 of
the North Carolina Constitution now authorizes "suspension of a jail
or prison term" as a punishment, 96 and the judge has the authority to
extend the period of probation9 7 and impose more limitations on the
liberties of the probationer rather than impose an active sentence.9" It
is now theoretically possible in North Carolina for a judge to order a
period of unreasonable searches for up to five years as the sentence for
probation violations rather than activate a jail term.99 The state
should not be allowed to waive Constitutional rights for the defendant
merely because it is more expedient and convenient for the state to
dispense with obtaining consent for searches incident to a valid proba-
tion decree.
90. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 896.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 898.
95. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342.
96. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1.
97. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342. "The court with the consent of the defendant may
extend the period of probation beyond the original period ...." Id.
98. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1.
99. Sec. 15A-1342 limits the period that probation may be imposed to five years. It
is unclear if the constitutional amendment allowing probation as a sentence may be
applied to probation violations themselves.
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VIII. SCOPE
A court may examine the scope of the search in determining the
validity of a warrantless probationary search if the validity of a proba-
tionary search is in issue.100 Probationary searches under § 15A-
1343(bl)(7) are very broad, and include the probationer, his vehicle,
and his home.1 ' A probation officer has the authority to charge the
probationer with specific offenses if contraband is discovered, in addi-
tion to charging the probationer with a probation violation. 10 2 While
it is true that any evidence seized as a result of an illegal search is
treated as the fruit of the poisonous tree' 0 3 and is subject to the exclu-
sionary rule in criminal trials, 10 4 this is not the case for probation rev-
ocation hearings. The exclusionary rule, which requires that "any
unconstitutionally seized evidence that could lead to an indictment...
be suppressed in a criminal trial",'05 does not apply to probation revo-
cation hearings. However, while not applicable to probationary hear-
ings, the exclusionary rule does apply to any future criminal
prosecutions based on contraband found during a search by a proba-
tion officer.'0 6 Under the North Carolina Constutition as amended,10 7
probation is defined as a punishment in itself (along with, for example,
imprisonment) rather than an option given to the defendant in lieu of
state sanctioned punishment, and given that a probationary period
may be imposed which is far in excess of the active sentence which
would be imposed under North Carolina Structured Sentencing Guide-
lines,'0 8 it is at least arguable that the exclusionary rule should, in fact,
apply to probation-related hearings. As to the admissibility in a future
criminal trial relating to the contraband discovered, it appears clear
that suppression would be the appropriate remedy.' 0 9
100. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(bl)(7).
102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-205.
103. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
104. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
105. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). The
exclusionary rule may apply, however, as a matter of statutory law. Under § 15A-
1342(g), "the failure of a defendant to object to a condition of probation imposed
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1343(bl) at the time such a condition is imposed does
not constitute a waiver of the right to object at a later time to the condition."
106. Scott, 524 U.S. at 369.
107. N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1.
108. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.1 et seq.
109. Scott, 524 U.S. at 369. See also Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In sum, the 1995 amendment to the North Carolina Constitution
authorizing "suspension of a jail or prison term" as an appropriate
sentence is not per se unconstitutional when applied as provided in
§ 15A-1343 et seq. The problem arises only in the situation where the
probationer is required to undergo unreasonable searches as part of
that probation. When the North Carolina General Assembly repealed
§ 15A-1341(c), a defendant's ability to refuse to consent to these
searches was revoked. 110 The North Carolina Legislature, in effect, has
revoked the defendant's search and seizure protections which are guar-
anteed under the Fourth Amendment. Such revocation of Fourth
Amendment rights is beyond the power of the legislature and is per se
unconstitutional.
Under the prior sentencing structure, the defendant's consent to
this term was acceptable because it satisfied the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment."1  In removing the consent provision from
§ 15A-1341(c), however, the court must find an alternative basis for
ordering unreasonable searches. After surveying the law, it is clear
that North Carolina is unable to justify this system. In trying to amend
the requirements of the North Carolina Constitution, the legislature
has brought the law of North Carolina into conflict with the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. None of the other
clearly delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements
are applicable to this statutory scheme.
While some courts have expressed concern over the consent
requirement, consent is a viable option for searches incident to proba-
tion and has been accepted in North Carolina. It would work little
harm upon the probation system for North Carolina courts to obtain
consent from the defendant to the probation decree before ordering a
search of the defendant, his vehicle, or his residence as an incidence of
probation. The Constitution requires no less.
Stacy C. Eggers, IV
110. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 429.
111. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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